What’s Next?
“The digital EORE project is an exciting project taking advantage of the opportunities new
technologies offer. Our lifesaving messages delivered through social media networks can
reach men, women, and teenagers living in remote areas and still living on land contaminated with explosive remnants of war. The project allows us to tremendously increase our
reach and increase the impact of our lifesaving work.”
~ Hélène Kuperman, Former MAG Country Director for Vietnam
MAG has established and integrated digital EORE into a number
of programs, country strategies, and proposals to provide a sustainable platform for further development. In 2023, MAG will continue
to develop digital EORE, including in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine,
Syria, Vietnam, and Ukraine, as well as developing digital provision to support small arms and light weapons (SALW) risk education. Similar to MAG’s approach with EORE, the purpose of SALW
risk education will be to raise awareness of the threat of SALW and
provide practical advice on how to reduce risks. Examples of practical SALW advice may include communicating the risks of firing
your weapon into the air and safety reasons for securing weapons.
Emerging in the sector before the COVID-19 pandemic began
in 2020, digital approaches became more important than ever
as teams around the world were severely limited in performing in-person EORE. The Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining’s (GICHD) Review of New Technologies
and Methodologies for EORE in Challenging Contexts captured the
growing number of activities across the humanitarian mine action
(HMA) sector, which led to the creation of the Digital Task Team as
an official offshoot of the EORE Advisory Group.2 Representatives
from HMA organizations around the world regularly meet to
develop strategies and best practices, and to formalize the initiative through a consistent monitoring and evaulation framework.

In May 2022, the first ever digital EORE workshop was hosted
by UNICEF and GICHD in Switzerland. The workshop gathered
around twenty EORE practitioners from across regions and organizations to take stock of tools, trends, successes, and gaps in
digital programming both in EORE and other humanitarian aid
sectors in order to strategically promote effective and ethical digital EORE in mine action. Participants drafted an action plan with
short-, medium-, and long-term actions—many of which could fall
under the scope of the Digital Task Team either through its existing subgroups or through the setup of new subgroups. Many HMA
organizations are now active in delivering some form of digital
EORE in countries on every continent.
Social media provides a new way to engage with communities in
a dynamic and cost-effective manner. It enables us to reach large
numbers of people in a specific area, overcoming obstacles posed
by security, geography, and complex operating environments that
limit the delivery of face-to-face risk education. The ability to
target people based on specific criteria will ensure that we reach
the most at-risk communities as well as groups that are harder to
attract through “traditional” face-to-face sessions such as youth
and young adults who are often the most difficult to reach.
See endnotes page 112
MAG’s digital EORE work is generously supported by the US
Department of State and Facebook.

Robin Toal
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THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICAL SECURITY
AND STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT:
A Successful Implementing Partnership Perspective

By Lee Moroney [ Golden West Humanitarian Foundation ]
and Mark Veneris [ US European Command HMA Program ]

T

o avoid unplanned explosion of munitions (UEM) and to lower the risk of illicit diversion, the
humanitarian requirements ensuring strong ammunition management structures, systems, and
processes by states have been well documented in past issues of this Journal and other publications. These needs have led to the evolution of multilateral and bilateral support from donor nations
that see the humanitarian value of supporting physical security and stockpile management (PSSM).
Over the past two decades, the Office of Weapons Removal
and Abatement in the US State Department's Bureau of PoliticalMilitary Affairs (PM/WRA) and the US Department of Defense
(DoD) have shown significant support for PSSM through the geographic combatant command (COCOM) programs. This article
analyzes how methods have changed from just planting the flag
with “first-aid fixes” to a holistic, capacity-building approach.
Even though early engagements in PSSM operations proved
that something is better than nothing, these actions had limited
impact. These varied from assessment missions with recommendations but “no teeth” to short-term training with no continuation
training or mentorship programs, while others involved building
storehouses without looking at procedural development support
or one-off disposal projects that ignored wider surveillance and
disposal planning. Presently, only one COCOM1 currently engages
in a comprehensive capacity development approach working to
develop national capability.

With Golden West implemented project management,
EUCOM provided financial support to renovate this
explosive storehouse (ESH).

All images courtesy of Golden West Humanitarian Foundation.

Georgian Defence
Forces conduct
explosive limit license
exercises during
EUCOM-Golden West
mentorship.

Robin Toal is Digital EORE Manager at MAG. He has fifteen years working in the
humanitarian sector in project management, innovation, and behavior change,
including the past ten years in humanitarian mine action with MAG and APOPO.
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Georgian Defence
Force graduates of
the EUCOM PSSM
foundation course.

The US Approach
The US European Command (EUCOM) is the US DoD’s
COCOM that has embraced this deliberate approach to its theater
security cooperation (TSC) programs and has been leading the
way with ongoing successful projects in Moldova, Georgia, and
Albania since 2018, with more countries to be supported in the
future. Since 2018, the EUCOM PSSM program has provided over
US$10,000,000 to support PSSM activities within its three main
focus areas: infrastructure support, equipment support, and training and mentorship support.
First steps. Like any successful TSC program, the core element to success begins with the host nation officially requesting
support rather than having support forced on them. This is the
first challenge, as it can be suggested that decision makers
generally don’t know what they don’t know. An approach
implemented by Golden West Humanitarian Foundation
(GWHF) in 2018, with donor support from PM/WRA,
brought together senior officers directly involved in PSSM
in their host countries to share their experiences in conversations chaired and guided by qualified practitioners. Also
invited as participants were the EUCOM HMA program
manager and subject-matter experts (SMEs).
Having the right people involved from the start and
enabling open dialogue rather than a one-way training
approach enabled various structural and capability gaps
to be identified so a baseline needs assessment could be
produced. This process ultimately led to support projects
starting in three countries within twelve months of these
meetings.
Maintaining momentum. Following the initial meetings, participants briefed their chain of command, and
follow-up meetings with high-level leaders and decisionmakers occured to maintain momentum and guarantee support for the host nation. Due to multiple layers of
Mentored by Golden West, Moldovan Armed
Forces conduct quantity distance on-the-job
training.
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bureaucracy to work through in recipient countries, momentum
is critical for multi-year PSSM activities that also depend on the
movement of other inter-dependent activities. By maintaining
momentum, projects can move forward successfully and in unison
with other relevant PSSM work. This level of host nation support
was possible through the combined efforts of the EUCOM team
(and combined US military) as well as the implementing international nongovernmental organizations’ (INGO) SMEs. We believe
this contributed to the overall success of the programs since previously lead PSSM initiatives had held numerous assessments with
limited authorities involved or budgets to work with, and failed to
conduct follow-up assessments.

EUCOM provided
infrastructure and equipment
for this ammunition depot in
Moldova. The program does
not just focus on explosive
storehouses but all facilities
that support best practices in
ammunition management for
safety and security.

Evolution of PSSM
One of the major evolutions over the past few years has been an
increase in communication and collaboration between countries,
donor governments, and international organizations. Beginning
with the introduction of the International Ammunition Technical
Guidelines (IATG) in 2011, the community now coordinates and
works together well, while the establishment of the Ammunition
Management Advisory Team (AMAT) at the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) is a good example of
how to bring international organizations together. Together with
organizations like the United Nations Office for Disarmament
Affairs (UNODA) and donors such as the United States, practitioners and implementing partners similar to GWHF and other

INGOs coordinate with and support countries who request PSSM
assistance. This multi-faceted working group in both official and
unofficial forms has engaged collaboratively throughout the development of Version 3 of the IATG. On behalf of EUCOM, GWHF
ensures that the execution of the new Version is implemented at
all levels—where support includes manageing infrastructure, procuring equipment, developing training, and providing SMEs and
(embedded) mentorship for host nations.
An additional evolution for PSSM was the modification of
United States Code Title 10 Section 407 in 2017 that placed the
authority to conduct PSSM activities squarely in the DOD HMA
TSC program.

Measuring Success
Success in PSSM can only be measured by lasting impact. As the
HMA community has learned through its demining efforts, ensuring a sustainable impact is immensely challenging. Compared to
demining, measuring PSSM success is even more difficult. Success
in demining can be determined by numbers, such as square meters
cleared, land released through survey, unexploded ordnance (UXO)
destroyed, abandoned explosive ordnance destroyed, countries
declared mine-free, etc. Less obvious are the metrics for PSSM,
which must be viewed through a different lens than mine action.
The EUCOM program views this success as supporting the development of a national capacity where countries have national regulations, procedures, political structures (within the responsible

ministries), tradesmanship, infrastructure, training, equipment,
supplies, and national budget allocations in place for PSSM programs. Through GWHF, EUCOM contracts experienced qualified
retired military personnel with HMA experience to work directly
with the host nation. They also engage closely with the US Office
of Defense Cooperation (ODC), who are generally working with
other elements of support to MOD structures in all of these levels
in a top-down and bottom-up approach.
The EUCOM program understands trust takes time to build
and works through partnerships with the host nation, ODCs, and
implementing partners such as GWHF, to develop a quantifiable
plan of action directed towards eventual fade out.

Over the past two decades, the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the US State Department's
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) and The US Department of Defense (DoD) have shown
significant support for PSSM through the geographic combatant command (COCOM) programs.
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Utilizing the results of EUCOM infrastructure upgrades,
with equipment provided to the Albanian Armed Forces.

Tailoring the Approach
As detailed at the start of this article, the level of long-term partnerships and multi-year assistance provided to countries are measures of success. Similarly, the updated UNSaferguard Quantity
Distance maps of depots represent an achievement of the program
that would reduce the risk and impact of a potential UEM. While
countries will rarely have exactly the same needs at the same levels of support, supporting synergies such as standardized training curriculums, training trackers, and national regulators are
required for most (but not all) countries. Qualified SMEs that can
advise, mentor, support training, manage programs in refurbishment/construction projects of old storage areas to IATG-compliant
standards, and procure equipment throughout the plan of action
are investments that donors employ to build a sustainable ammunition management program.
EUCOM continues to refurbish ammunition depots and compounds, and provides equipment ranging from the basic materials such as pallets and banding equipment to mechanical handling
equipment (MHE). The program is concurrently developing and
executing a comprehensive phased train-the-trainer program from
basic ammunition management through to an upper management
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Albanian personnel inspect, audit, palletize,
and store ammunition in accordance with
international best practices .
level based on the IATGs. By creating various levels of regulatory
and procedural review for each country, EUCOM identifies relevant, implementable, and sustainable focus areas for the partner
country through the US military and GWHF SMEs.
While the EUCOM example may not be appropriate for every
country, geopolitics and funding may dictate that support to one
country requires multiple-lateral engagement. However, even with
the best of intentions, this approach can be more difficult. Aspects
of financial and operational support may need to synchronize,
stretching the capacity of an already over-extended host nation.
As PSSM challenges arise, EUCOM will proudly continue to
support countries that have requested assistance. Accepting these
challenges, GWHF, as a US-founded and US-based INGO, will
continue to leverage the technical expertise and project management it has provided the US Government. However, the partner
nations deserve recognition for taking the first step, choosing to
open up their structures, facilities, and regulations to strengthening their capacity and capabilities for a safer and more secure
ammunition management structure.
See endnotes page 112
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